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Executive Summary 
Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a 
radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive 
material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive 
material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" 
that are not nuclear detonations but are explosives designed to spread radioactive material (National 
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also could come 
from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, including 
waterways and water supply systems. 
This document develops plausible, likely scenarios, including the identification of likely radioactive 
materials and quantities of those radioactive materials to be involved. These include 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 
192Ir, 226Ra, Pu, and 241Am.  
Two broad categories of scenarios are considered. The first category includes events that may be 
suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a dirty bomb in downtown Seattle. The explosion 
would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., natural gas, industrial explosion, or terrorist 
RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to quickly detect the 
radioisotopes previously listed, assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if 
possible) detrimental effects resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of 3 to 4 hours 
might be available before any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
The second category includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples 
of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the 
sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging 
apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be carried to a treatment plant. Other 
scenarios might include a terrorist deliberately putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. 
Alternatively, a botched terrorism preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering 
wastewater without anyone's knowledge. Drinking water supplies, bottled or packaged beverages, and 
foodstuffs may also be contaminated, with the result that some or most of the radioactivity ends up in 
wastewater. In some of these scenarios, the first evidence that an incident has occurred may be detection 
of radioactive material in wastewater. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In the United States there are no identified cases in which radioactive materials in sewage 
systems are a threat to the health and safety of publicly-owned treatment works (POTW) 
workers or the general public. However, there have been a small number of facilities where 
elevated levels of man-made radioactive materials were detected. Based upon this past 
experience, there is a concern that radioactive material could concentrate in sewage sludge 
and ash and could pose a threat to the health and safety of workers or the public. 
                                          (Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003c).  
Staff of the King County Wastewater Treatment Division (WTD) have concern about the aftermath of a 
radiological dispersion event (RDE) leading to the introduction of significant quantities of radioactive 
material into the combined sanitary and storm sewer system in King County, Washington. Radioactive 
material could come from the use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). RDDs include "dirty bombs" 
that are not nuclear detonations but are conventional explosives designed to spread radioactive material  
(National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001). Radioactive material also 
could come from deliberate introduction or dispersion of radioactive material into the environment, 
including waterways and water supply systems. 
This document develops plausible RDE scenarios, including the identification of likely radioactive 
materials and quantities of those radioactive materials to be involved. These include 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 
192Ir, 226Ra, Pu, and 241Am.  
Two broad categories of scenarios are considered. The first category includes events that may be 
suspected from the outset, such as an explosion of a dirty bomb in downtown Seattle. The explosion 
would most likely be heard, but the type of explosion (e.g., natural gas, industrial explosion, or terrorist 
RDD) may not be immediately known. Emergency first responders must be able to quickly detect the 
radioisotopes previously listed, assess the situation, and deploy a response to contain and mitigate (if 
possible) detrimental effects resulting from the incident. In such scenarios, advance notice of 3 to 4 hours 
might be available before any contaminated wastewater reaches a treatment plant. 
The second category includes events that could go initially undetected by emergency personnel. Examples 
of such a scenario would be the inadvertent or surreptitious introduction of radioactive material into the 
sewer system. Intact rogue radioactive sources from industrial radiography devices, well-logging 
apparatus, or moisture density gages may get into wastewater and be carried to a treatment plant. Other 
scenarios might include a terrorist deliberately putting a dispersible radioactive material into wastewater. 
Alternatively, a botched terrorism preparation of an RDD may result in radioactive material entering 
wastewater without anyone's knowledge. Drinking water supplies, bottled or packaged beverages, and 
foodstuffs may also be contaminated, with the result that some or most of the radioactivity ends up in 
wastewater. In some of these scenarios, the first evidence that an incident has occurred may be detection 
of radioactive material in wastewater. 
This document only briefly covers the event of the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND), the 
Department of Homeland Security’s term for a home-made nuclear weapon. Also, it does not address 
accidents at nuclear power reactors since there are none near Seattle. Finally, the report does not address 
sabotage of spent nuclear fuel shipments, since there is no commerce in nuclear power reactor fuel in the 
Puget Sound area. 
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2.0 Radiation and Radioactive Materials 
This section provides background information on radioactive materials and the radiation they emit, and 
identifies the radioactive materials that are widely regarded to be of interest in the context of radiological 
terrorism.  
2.1 Ionizing Radiation  
Radiation includes ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. Examples of non-ionizing radiation are radio 
waves, microwaves, infrared light (radiant heat), visible light, and ultraviolet light.  
Ionizing radiation includes x-rays, and high-energy radiation emitted by radioactive materials and nuclear 
reactions such as a nuclear reactor or nuclear explosion. Ionizing radiation includes alpha, beta, gamma, 
and x-radiation, and neutrons. Each of these types of radiation differs in its penetrating power and the 
nature of its interactions with matter. Each type of radiation poses its own challenges for detection and 
protection.  
From here on, the term “radiation” is used to mean “ionizing radiation.” 
Excellent guides to radiation are available on-line (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2004b; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003b). 
2.1.1 Alpha Radiation  
Alpha radiation, sometimes denoted by the Greek letter α, is the least penetrating kind of radiation. Alpha 
radiation can be completely absorbed and stopped by 2” of air or a thin sheet of paper, and will not 
penetrate the outermost, dead layer of human skin (Figure 1). However, if alpha radiation is emitted from 
radioactive material inside the body, it is more damaging than other types of radiation. Alpha radiation is 
composed of γ-particles, another name for the nucleus of a helium atom containing 2 protons and 2 
neutrons. 
2.1.2 Beta Radiation  
Beta radiation, sometimes denoted by the Greek letter β, is more penetrating than α-radiation. Beta 
radiation can be completely absorbed and stopped by 1/2” or less of plastic or water (Figure 1). Beta 
radiation may penetrate up to 1/2” of skin and muscle, and if emitted from radioactive material inside the 
body, it can cause tissue damage. Beta radiation is composed of electrons, which behave as high-speed 
particles. 
2.1.3 Gamma Radiation and X-Radiation 
Gamma radiation, sometimes denoted by the Greek letter γ, is physically identical to x-rays, but originates 
in nuclear reactions such as radioactive decay. Gamma and x-radiation can be highly penetrating, with 
some of it passing all the way through the body and some being absorbed within the body. Gamma and x-
radiation can be reduced by shielding with materials such as water, earth, concrete, iron, and lead 
(Figure 1). The amount of shielding needed depends on the energy and intensity of the radiation. If 
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emitted from radioactive material inside the body, gamma radiation can cause tissue damage. Gamma and 
x-radiation are electromagnetic radiation, like radio waves and light. 
2.1.4 Neutron Radiation 
Neutron radiation only occurs in nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons detonations, and at high-energy 
accelerators. It is only mentioned for completeness and is not discussed further. 
Figure 1. Interactions of various kinds of radiation with matter. The width of each bar indicates 
the intensity of the radiation. Alpha radiation is absorbed by even a thin sheet of paper. Beta radiation 
is more penetrating, but can be stopped by 1/2” or less of a material like plastic or water, 1/4” of 
concrete, or 1/8” of steel. Gamma and x-radiation pass easily through plastic, but are stopped by 
massive shields of water, earth, concrete, iron, or lead. Fast neutrons can penetrate modest amounts of 
lead, but are stopped by materials containing hydrogen, such as water, concrete, plastic, oil, or wax.  
 
Concrete sewer pipes often have walls that may be 1” thick for each foot of diameter. Thus, a large 
diameter pipe may provide significant shielding for its radioactive contents. As shown in Figure 8, 10” of 
concrete absorbs 90% of the most energetic radiation that may be emitted from contaminated wastewater. 
Since earth is a good shielding material, radiation from buried pipes will be mostly or entirely absorbed 
by a thick covering of dirt. 
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2.2 Radioactive Materials  
Radioactive materials are simply chemicals or substances containing some radioactive atoms. Radioactive 
materials may be solid (metal, crystalline, ceramic, powder, salt); liquid (dissolved or suspended); or 
gaseous (including gases, vapors, mists, and airborne dust) depending on the particular chemical and 
physical form. Radioactive materials may or may not be water soluble. 
2.2.1 Radioactive Atoms 
Radioactive atoms are unstable and undergo spontaneous changes in their atomic nuclei. These changes 
result in the emission of ionizing radiation such as alpha particles, beta particles, and gamma or x-
radiation. The transition of each atomic nucleus results in a new nucleus, generally of a different chemical 
element. Radioactive materials are identified as a chemical element, such as cobalt, and the number of 
particles in its nucleus, such as 60. Such a combination, for example, cobalt-60 (60Co), is called a 
radionuclide. A 60Co atom emits a beta particle and two gamma rays when it transitions into a non-
radioactive nickel-60 atom. 
Radioactivity is the phenomenon of these spontaneous changes with the resulting emission of ionizing 
radiation. Radioactive atoms that undergo decay may turn into stable, non-radioactive atoms, or they may 
turn into new, different radioactive atoms. An example of the latter is the transition of radioactive 
strontium-90 (90Sr) into radioactive yttrium-90 (90Y), which in turn transitions into stable zirconium-90. 
2.2.2 Amount of Radioactivity: the Activity in Curies (or Becquerels) 
The amount of radioactivity that a sample of radioactive material contains is called the activity and is 
traditionally measured in units called curies (unit symbol: Ci)1. One curie is 37,000,000,000 nuclear 
transitions per second. A curie is generally a lot of radioactivity, so smaller units are often used, such as 
the millicurie (mCi), which is 0.001 Ci, and the microcurie (µCi), which is 0.000 001 Ci. A smoke 
detector typically contains 0.9 µCi of americium-241 (241Am).  
2.2.3 Radioactive Decay and Half-Life 
As radioactive atoms transition to new atoms with the emission of radiation, the amount of radioactivity is 
said to decay. This means that there is less and less of it over time. The rate at which radioactivity 
decreases is expressed in terms of the half-life of the material, which is a characteristic of each 
radionuclide. 
                                                     
1 Most countries, and the U.S. Department of Transportation, use the becquerel (Bq) as the unit of 
activity. 1 Bq is one radioactive transition per second, so 1 Ci = 37,000,000,000 Bq. Packages marked 
with for DOT shipping labels are commonly marked in megabecquerels (1 MBq ~ 27 µCi), 
gigabecquerels (1 GBq ~ 27 mCi) or terabecquerels (1 TBq ~ 27 Ci). 
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2.2.4 Exposure to Radiation Emitted by Radioactive Materials 
Radioactive materials emit radiation. A person may be exposed to this radiation by coming near a source 
that emits penetrating radiation such as gamma radiation (bottom row in Figure 2), or if the person inhales 
or ingests the material, or gets the material on the skin (Figure 2). Following intakes via ingestion or 
inhalation, some of the radioactive material will remain in the human body the same way a non-
radioactive chemical would remain in the body. Usually, most inhaled or ingested material is cleared out 
of the body in a few days, but this is not always the case. While the radioactive material is in the body, 
radiation it emits can be absorbed in the body, leading to radiation dose. 
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Figure 2. Sources of radioactive material, exposures to radioactive materials, intakes and ontakes of 
radioactive materials, and irradiation by radioactive materials (Strom and Watson 2002).  
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2.3 Characteristics of Radioactive Materials that May Be Used for Malicious 
Purposes 
The characteristics of selected radionuclides are given in the Table 1. These are of particular interest 
because they are plentiful in relatively large amounts. Half-lives and principal radiation types are shown. 
The D-values are internationally-recognized dangerous amounts of these radionuclides (International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2003) in units of curies or terabecquerels (TBq), where 1 Ci = 0.037 
TBq. For the most common chemical forms of these radionuclides, note the incredibly small mass 
associated with a dangerous amount of radioactivity. As shown in the last three columns, these 
radioactive materials may have industrial, medical, or defense uses. 
Table 1. List of radionuclides of concern. Some emit more than one kind of radiation. D-values are 
threshold values for dangerous amounts in curies, terabecquerels, and milligrams (mg) if the 
radionuclide is not diluted with non-radioactive material. Use or origin indicates where the 
radionuclides may be in use. 
   Radiation D-value Use or Origin 
Radionuclide Symbol Half-life 
al
ph
a 
be
ta
 
ga
m
m
a Ci TBq mg 
In
du
st
ria
l 
M
ed
ic
al
 
D
ef
en
se
 
cobalt-60 60Co   5 years  β γ 0.8 0.03 0.7 x x  
strontium-90 90Sr  28 years  β  30 1 450 x x  
molybdenum-
99 
99Mo 66 hours  β γ 8 0.3 0.017  x  
iodine-131 131I 8 days  β γ 5 0.2 0.04  x  
cesium-137 137Cs 30 years  β γ 3 0.1 44 x x  
iridium-192 192Ir 75 days  β γ 2 0.08 0.2 x x  
radium-226 226Ra 1600 years α β γ 1 0.04 1,000 x   
uranium U 4.5 billion years α β weak   - x  x 
americium-241 241Am 432 years α  γ 2 0.06 580 x  x 
plutonium Pu 24,000 years α β weak 2 0.06 - x  x 
2.4 Amounts that affect humans 
Radiation is like money in one sense: you can’t talk meaningfully about it unless you know how much 
you’re talking about! There are amounts of radioactive material that are so small that they are of no 
concern.  
Furthermore, radioactive materials exist in nature. Radioactive uranium, thorium and potassium-40 are 
primordial radioactive materials that have been on earth since the dawn of time. They are found 
everywhere and occur in trace amounts in all food and beverage. All human beings have eaten these trace 
amounts all of their lives, and all contain traces of these radioactive materials. 
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2.4.1 Normal Levels of Radioactive Materials in Sewage 
Medical-use radionuclides are legally discharged2 into sanitary sewers every day as they are passed out of 
patients who have received them for diagnosis and treatment (Nakamura et al. 2005; Hilton, Harvey, and 
Simmonds 2004; Hotte and Sokolek 2001; Brennan 1997; Miller et al. 1996; Ainsworth et al. 1994; 
Kennedy Jr. et al. 1992; Larsen et al. 1992; Prichard, Gesell, and Davis 1981; Sodd, Velten, and Saenger 
1975; Blake and Rapley 1972). 
A recent survey conduced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and Department of Energy (DOE) revealed very low levels of natural and human-made 
radionuclides in sewage sludge and ash (Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003b): 
The survey obtained sewage sludge and incinerator ash samples from 313 POTWs across the country. A 
total of 45 radionuclides were detected, with eight radionuclides (Be-7, Bi-214, I-131, K-40, Pb-212, Pb-
214, Ra-226, and Ra-228) reported in more than 200 samples. Highest concentrations were observed for 
I-131, Tl-201, and Sr-89 (all short half-lived medical isotopes). Many samples contained radium and 
uranium.  
Three overall conclusions arose.  
1) Elevated levels of radioactive materials were found in some sewage sludge and ash samples, 
but did not indicate a wide-spread problem;  
2) Estimated doses to potentially exposed individuals are generally well below levels requiring 
radiation protection actions; and  
3) For limited POTW worker and on-site resident scenarios, doses above protective standards 
could occur. This was primarily due to indoor radon generated as a decay product of naturally 
occurring radionuclides, such as Ra-226 and Th-228. 
How much radioactive material, then, would be of concern? The D-values given in the Table 1 above are 
amounts of radioactivity that are likely to cause injury or death from a couple of days’ exposure under 
some circumstances.  
To answer the “How much?” question, we must have a “currency” for radiation dose.  
2.4.2 Amount of Radiation Absorbed: Dose in Rems 
Radioactive materials are chemicals that emit radiation. When the body absorbs radiation, the radiation 
can cause change, damage, or harm, depending on the amount. An amount of radiation is called a dose. In 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Washington State Department of Health, Radiation Protection Standards. Chapter 
246-221 Washington Administrative Code; specifically, 246-221-190, “Disposal by release into sanitary 
sewerage systems” which states, “(2) Excreta from individuals undergoing medical diagnosis or therapy 
with radioactive material shall be exempt from any limitations contained in this section.” For a federal 
perspective, see Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.2003 (10 CFR 20.2003), “Disposal by 
release into sanitary sewerage” and 10 CFR 35.75, “Release of individuals containing unsealed byproduct 
material or implants containing byproduct material” for sample federal regulations.  
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the U.S., radiation dose is measured in a unit called a rem.3 Often, dose is measured in millirems, where 1 
mrem = 1/1,000 rem. 
2.4.3 Everyday Radiation Doses 
For perspective, each of us receives around 0.2 to 0.3 rems (200 to 300 millirems) each year from natural 
radionuclides and other natural sources of radiation.  
Many medical procedures (x-rays, CT scans, or nuclear medicine exams), produce doses in the range of 
0.01 rem (chest x-ray) to 5 rems (CT, nuclear medicine) to part or all of the body. 
2.4.4 Dose Limits for Workers and the Public 
Federal agencies such as theNRC (1993), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ( 1971) and 
state agencies such as the Washington State Department of Health ( 2005) have adopted regulatory limits 
for exposures of the public and for radiation workers. 
2.4.4.1 Worker Dose Limits 
A radiation worker is a person who normally works with radiation or radioactive materials as part of his 
or her job, and who has received training in radiation protection and the biological effects of radiation. 
The dose limit for workers is 5 rems per year from human-made sources, and employers are required to 
keep doses as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) below this limit. In emergencies, workers are 
generally allowed to receive 25 rems while conducting critical or life-saving activities. There are unlikely 
to be any clinical symptoms at this dose level.  
2.4.4.2 Public Dose Limits 
Radiation dose limits for the public are lower than for radiation workers, because  
• the public does not gain the benefit of a paycheck from radiation doses (other than medical 
exposures) 
• the public includes the very young, children, and the elderly, all of whom may be more sensitive 
to radiation than adults who are healthy enough to work.  
King County WTD workers are currently considered members of the public, and not radiation workers4. 
                                                     
3In Europe and the most of the rest of the world, radiation dose is measured in a unit called the sievert 
(Sv), where 1 Sv = 100 rems. Common sub-multiples of the sievert are the millisieverts (1 mSv = 1/1,000 
Sv = 100 mrem), and the microsieverts (1 µSv = 1/1,000,000 Sv = 0.1 mrem). 
4 It is legitimate to ask whether, in the event of an act of war or an emergency such as a radiological 
dispersion event, all public servants such as firefighters, emergency medical technicians, police, 
HAZMAT teams, and even WTD employees become radiation workers. 
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The dose limit to the public is 0.1 rems (100 millirems) per year from human-made sources (excluding 
medical).  
2.4.4.3 EPA Drinking Water Radionuclide Concentration Limits 
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA has drinking water standards that are expressed as 
concentrations of radionuclides in water, usually in units of picocuries per liter (pCi/L). One picocurie is 
one trillionth of a curie. These maximum contaminant levels are found in 40 CFR Part 141.16, 
“Maximum contaminant levels for beta particle and photon radioactivity from man-made radionuclides in 
community water systems.” The EPA limits are for ingestion of drinking water, and are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. EPA limits from 40 CFR 141, National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations 
Radionuclide Value Unit 
226Ra + 228Ra  5 pCi/L 
Gross alpha 15 pCi/L 
3H  20,000 pCi/L 
90Sr 8 pCi/L 
U 30 µg/L 
Other  emitters 4 mrem/year 
2.4.5 The Health Effects of Short-Term Irradiation 
Low doses of radiation, such as those received from natural sources every year, do not produce any 
clinical symptoms in people. However, low doses of radiation may lead to a slight increase in cancer risk 
later in life. For purposes of radiation protection in peacetime, it is assumed that 1 rem leads to a 0.05% 
increase in cancer risk (International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) 1991). Since over 
40% of people get a serious cancer at some point in their lives, and about 23% of us die from cancer, a 1-
rem dose would lead to a lifetime risk of 23% + 0.05%, or 23.05% lifetime fatal cancer risk.  
Higher doses produce clinical symptoms (Strom 2003). At 100 rems, some people will feel tired and 
perhaps nauseous, and have a lowered white blood cell count for a few weeks, but will recover 
completely. Doses of 200 rems or more received over a period of hours lead to clinical symptoms. With 
no medical care, 300 rems is a lethal dose for about 50 % of people, while intensive medical care can save 
most people at this dose level. Few people can survive a dose of 600 rems delivered in a few hours, even 
with good medical care. If the dose is protracted over weeks, months, or years, there would be few or no 
symptoms (Strom 2005). 
Excellent, readable information on health effects of radiation is available from the NRC (U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) 1996; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 1999), the EPA (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 2004a), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003a). 
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3.0 Scenarios for Entry, Transport, and Fate of Radionuclides in 
Wastewater 
This section describes radioactive sources that may be available to persons with malicious intent, and 
scenarios for entry, transport, and fate of radionuclides in wastewater. 
3.1 Radioactive Materials that May Fall into the Wrong Hands 
A variety of radionuclides in a number of physical and chemical forms may become available to persons 
with malicious intent, as listed in Table 1. Common chemical and physical forms are found in Table 3. 
Many of the larger radionuclide sources are found doubly encapsulated in tough stainless steel canisters 
that are seamlessly welded shut. Parts of typical 60Co teletherapy sources are shown in Figures 3 and 4. A 
dummy “pigtail” source of 192Ir is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 3. Parts of a dummy 60Co teletherapy source. All of the radioactive materials are in the 
pellets, made of cobalt and nickel metal. At the right are spacers, with the inner capsule (center) and 
outer capsule (left). Each capsule is welded shut. The outer capsule is placed in a rugged source 
holder. 
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Figure 4. Photograph of metal 60Co pellets such as those involved in the 1983 Juarez, Mexico, 
incident. Such pellets, if dispersed in wastewater, would be negligibly soluble and would follow 
large sand grains. Some may wind up in grit or be entrained in rags and debris. Each pellet may be 
several curies of activity, and the collection shown would produce very dangerous levels of radiation. 
Table 3. Initial Chemical and Physical Forms of Radionuclides. 
Radionuclide Initial Chemical and Physical Forms 
cobalt-60 metal (solid) or metal pieces (grains of rice) encapsulated in stainless steel; see 
Figures 3 and 4 
strontium-90 ceramic SrTiO3 (strontium titanate) in strong metal container 
molybdenum-99 adsorbed to an ion exchange resin inside a lead radiation shield 
iodine-131 liquid or NaI capsule 
cesium-137 CsCl encapsulated in stainless steel 
iridium-192 metal (solid) encapsulated in stainless steel (Figure 5), or as tiny needles or metal 
seeds 
radium-226 RaCl2 encapsulated in various holders 
uranium metal, salts 
americium-241 metal, possibly mixed with beryllium and encapsulated in stainless steel 
plutonium metal or oxide 
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Figure 5. A typical [dummy] gamma radiography source that may contain up to 200 curies (7.4 
terabecquerels) of 60Co or 192Ir (177 or 22 mg, respectively, if at 100% radionuclide purity). The 
radioactive material is encapsulated at the very tip of the cable. Touching a real source like this would 
cause severe radiation burns to the finger tips in seconds. Such sources are stored and shipped in 
locked, sturdy, heavy, shielded containers with warning labels. 
Although handling multiples of D-value quantities of these radionuclides may very rapidly lead to 
radiation burns, other severe irreversible injury, and even death, terrorists have shown themselves willing 
to risk life and limb. Thus, despite the fact that handling such sources may be immediately dangerous to 
life and health, it is not prudent to believe that terrorists will be deterred by such dangers. 
3.2 Dispersal Scenarios 
Individuals with malicious intent may find ways to disperse sources. The popular press and technical 
sources (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 2001) have reported that 
explosive dispersal may occur, or that material may be distributed in the air by other means of generating 
an aerosol. If the radioactive material can be dissolved, it could be sprayed in solution or added to food, 
beverage, or municipal water supplies. 
Radioactive material may enter the wastewater stream in effluents from any drain entering the sewer 
system, and, in the case of King County’s WTD, through the storm sewer. If radioactive material is 
discovered to have been dispersed, one of the first responses may be to have the fire department wash it 
into the sewers. Certainly this tactic has always been part of plans for recovery from nuclear attack (Sartor 
1982). 
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3.3  Benchmark Cases 
Two limiting cases will be developed in some detail: a case of mostly insoluble 60Co pellets entering the 
system, and a case of completely soluble 137CsCl entering the system. 
3.3.1 The Insoluble Scenario: Cobalt-60 (60Co) Pellets 
The 60Co pellets scenario can be used to represent 90SrTiO3 (a ceramic); 192Ir; uranium, americium, or 
plutonium metal fragments; and other insoluble forms such as an intact sealed source.  
3.3.2 The Soluble Scenario: Cesium Chloride (137CsCl) 
The 137CsCl scenario can be used to represent any soluble material such as 99Mo, Na131I, or 226RaCl2.  
3.4 Fate of Radioactive Material in the Wastewater System 
The fate of radioactive material in the wastewater system depends on its chemical and physical form 
(Table 4). Radioactive materials in wastewater would not be expected to be present in sufficient quantities 
to affect pipes, pumps, valves, or microorganisms in digesters, given the relatively large dilution factors. 
In 1994, an NRC study showed that radioactive materials may concentrate in sewage sludge (Ainsworth 
et al. 1994). Few measurements are available for retention of specific radionuclides in the various waste 
streams. The only data available for cobalt and cesium are from Stetar et al. ( 1993), while two sources 
report values for 131I (Prichard, Gesell, and Davis 1981). Sewage system processes that reduce the volume 
of sludge through dewatering, incineration, and other technologies result in the further reconcentration of 
radionuclides. After being dispersed in wastewater, radioactive materials may reconcentrated in rags, grit 
or biosolids. Radioactive material in biosolids can become further concentrated as biosolids are dried or 
burned. Under normal conditions, radioactive materials found in biosolids are not considered an exposure 
risk (Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003c; Interagency Steering Committee on 
Radiation Standards 2003b; Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003a). The 
concentration of radioactive material in sewage sludge and ash is a topic of concern that has not been 
fully addressed (Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards 2003c). 
Under the off-normal conditions of a radiological accident or attack, unprecedented amounts of material 
(activities measured in curies) may be present in wastewater. In these cases, potentially dangerous levels 
of radiation may be present if the radioactive materials reconcentrate in rags, stones or grit, biosolids, or 
may adhere to surfaces of pipes and other equipment. 
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Table 4. Estimates (in italics) of low and high ranges of percent of radioactive material entering 
a combined sanitary and storm sewer system that will appear in various waste streams or be 
retained for some time on surfaces within the system (based on Ainsworth et al. 1994). Boldface 
values are measurements. 
Screenings Rocks or Grit Biosolids 
Treated 
Water Surfacesc 
Form 
Entering 
Sewer Material Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
metal pieces 
60Co, 192Ir, U, 
238Pu, 241Am trace ? 50% 100% 10% 50% trace trace trace 20% 
fine particles 
60Co, 90Sr, 192Ir, 
226Ra, U, 238Pu, 
241Am 
trace ? trace 10% 80% 90% trace 10% trace 20% 
dissolveda 60Co - - - - 31% 69% - - 
dissolved or 
soluble 
90Sr, 192Ir, 
226Ra, U, 238Pu, 
241Am 
trace ? trace 10% 10% 50% 20% 80% trace 20% 
metal, ceramic 90Sr, 226Ra trace ? 50% 100% 10% 50% trace trace trace 20% 
bound to resin 99Mo trace ? 50% 90% 10% 50% trace trace trace 20% 
dissolveda 131I - - - - 2% 98% - - 
dissolvedb 131I - - - - 23% 77% - - 
dissolveda 137Cs - - - - 12% 88% - - 
aStetar et al. 1993. 
bPrichard et al. 1981. 
cSome material may adhere to the slime layer on pipes and equipment, and other material may 
precipate with phosphates, recovered from sewage as struvite (magnesium ammonium phosphate). 
It is clear from Table 4 that a great deal of uncertainty exists on the efficacy of treatment of wastewater 
for the removal of radioactive material, and that even rough estimates of radiological hazards in various 
parts of the wastewater treatment process must be tempered with statements that they are uncertain. It 
must be concluded that protective actions should be based on extensive, ongoing measurements of 
radiation and radioactive material following an incident. 
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4.0 Exposure Pathways from Radioactive Materials in Wastewater 
Systems 
Radioactive materials in wastewater may potentially expose members of the public, WTD workers, WTD 
microorganisms in the digesters, and the flora and fauna in the environment through a variety of routes. 
These may be  
• direct irradiation, as shown at the bottom of Figure 2 
• by getting radioactive material on the skin 
• by getting radioactive material in the body via ingestion 
• by getting radioactive material in the body via inhalation, as shown in the rest of Figure 2.  
This section examines the routes of exposure in sequence for each of several logically distinct points or 
processes. These are 
• wastewater in pipes on the way to the plant 
• pumping stations 
• wastewater in the treatment plant 
• slime and coated surfaces in treatment plant 
• screenings in plant 
• screenings in dumpster at disposal site 
• grit in plant 
• grit in dumpster at disposal site 
• biosolids in digesters 
• biosolids in trucks 
• biosolids applied to crops 
• crops eaten 
• resuspended dust from biosolids 
• treated water 
• untreated water (WTD bypass). 
It is important to note that all pathways leading to exposure of the public are also potential pathways 
leading to exposure of WTD workers, who are often more likely than members of the public to be near 
WTD facilities and infrastructure. 
The exposure pathways evaluated below are discussed in the absence of any protective measures for 
public, workers, microorganisms, or the environment, and in the absence of any security measures that 
might prevent entry of radioactive materials into the wastewater system. 
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4.1 Direct Irradiation 
Direct irradiation of wastewater workers and the public from radioactive material is possible. Radioactive 
materials may be found 
• in influent (untreated wastewater) 
• in sediment in wastewater pipes 
• on surfaces of pipes and equipment that contacts wastewater 
• in screenings 
• in grit 
• in biosolids 
• in treated effluent. 
While in wastewater, the huge wastewater volumes work both to dilute the radioactive material and to 
shield (absorb) the radiation it emits before it can get to people. Earth is an excellent radiation shield, and 
buried sewer lines are shielded depending on their depth. Even an intense radiation source would be 
undetectable on the other side of ten feet of concrete or packed earth! 
Of the radionuclides listed in Table 1, 60Co, 99Mo, 131I, 137Cs, 192Ir, and 226Ra are strong emitters of gamma 
radiation. Strontium-90, with its decay product 90Y, emits energetic beta particles with limited range that 
are stopped by 1/2 inch of water. The other materials, U, 241Am, and Pu are not primarily external 
radiation hazards; they are hazardous when they are taken into the human body by inhalation, ingestion, 
or entry through an open wound or injection. 
4.1.1 Factors Affecting Radiation Intensity (Dose Rate) from Direct Irradiation 
Radiation dose from direct irradiation varies with characteristics of both the source and the person or 
object being exposed. Reducing radiation intensity (called the radiation “dose rate”) can be done by 
minimizing the amount of the material, minimizing the time a person is near the source, maximizing the 
distance from the source, and maximizing the amount of shielding around the source to absorb the 
radiation. 
The intensity of the radiation at a particular point in the plant depends on source variables including 
• amount of radioactive material (activity) 
• how long it is there or how long it takes to pass through that point in the plant (residence time of 
the radioactive material) 
• configuration and shielding of the radioactive material 
• distance. 
These variables can be controlled when the source is known to be present. For example, removal of 
radioactive material and its proper disposal as radioactive waste can reduce or eliminate the amount 
radioactive material that is producing radiation, thereby reducing radiation dose rates. Moving a source 
away reduces the radiation intensity, so that, if a source is moving with wastewater, a stationary person 
experiences a reduction in radiation intensity as the source moves away. Placing radiation-absorbing 
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barriers (shielding materials) between a location to be protected and the source reduces radiation 
intensity. Setting up exclusion zones and evacuation can be used to maximize distance and minimize 
radiation intensity. 
The predominant personal variable is exposure time. This variable can be controlled when the source is 
known to be present by spending as little time near it as possible. 
4.1.1.1 Radiation Intensity (Dose Rate) and Amount of Radiation (Rate) 
For unshielded radioactive sources, radiation intensity (dose rate) depends on the source strength (its 
activity in curies) and diminishes rapidly with increasing distance from the source. The amount of 
radiation (dose) is proportional to how much time one spends in a radiation field. See Figure 6 for a 
comparison with speed and distance. 
 
Figure 6. Amount of radiation (dose in millirems) is like distance measured on an odometer, 
while radiation intensity (dose rate in millirems per hour) is like speed measured on a speedometer. 
Just like distance in miles = (speed in miles per hour) × (driving time in hours), dose in millirems = 
(dose rate in millirems per hour) × (exposure time in hours). 
4.1.1.2 Unshielded Sources 
If radioactive material becomes concentrated and separated from water, it may produce much higher 
radiation intensities than if it is mixed with or covered with water. For example, when new, each tiny 
pellet of 60Co shown in Figures 3 and 4 could have an activity of up to 1 Ci, leading to a dose rate of 12.5 
rems per hour at one foot, a serious but not immediately dangerous dose rate. Dose rate constants for 
selected radionuclides are given in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Dose rate constants for radionuclides emitting significant gamma radiation. 
Nuclide 
Effective Dose 
Equivalent 
(rem/hour at 1 ft. 
from 1 Ci)a 
Exposure 
(R/hour at 1 ft. from 
1 Ci)b 
Effective Dose 
Equivalent 
(rem/hour at 1 m 
from 1 Ci)c 
Exposure 
(R/hour at 1 m from 
1 Ci)d 
60Co 12.5 14.0 1.16 1.30 
131I 2.25 2.37 0.21 0.22 
137Cs 3.21 3.53 0.30 0.33 
192Ir 4.81 5.00 0.45 0.46 
226Ra 9.02 13.2 0.84 1.23 
241Am 0.25 2.38 0.023 0.22 
aTechnically, the units are (rem/hour)(ft.2/Ci) 
bTechnically, the units are (R/hour)(ft.2/Ci), where R denotes “roentgens” 
aTechnically, the units are (rem/hour)(m2/Ci) 
bTechnically, the units are (R/hour)(m2/Ci), where R denotes “roentgens” 
 
For sources that are small with respect to the distance one is away from the source, the radiation intensity 
(dose rate) decreases inversely with the square of the distance. So the dose rate at 2 feet from the 60Co 
source is 1/22 = 1/4 of the dose rate at 1 foot, and the dose rate at 3 feet is 1/32 = 1/9 of the dose rate at 1 
foot. A simple formula relates dose rate to activity: 
 
.
feet)in  (Distance
curies)inActivityConstant)(Rate(Dosehour)Rate(rems/ Dose 2=
 (1) 
This formula can be used to determine the activity of a source if the dose rate can be measured at a known 
distance: 
 
.
Constant) Rate (Dose
rems/hour)in  Rate (Dosefeet)in  (Distancecuriesin Activity 
2
=
 (2) 
For example, if one measured 0.1 rem per hour at 100 feet from a 60Co source, the activity would be 
 
curies. 80
curie) 1 fromfoot  1at rems/hour  (12.5
rems/hour) (0.1(100)curiesin Activity 
2
==
 (3) 
This is a possible value for a 60Co industrial radiography source such as the pigtail source shown in 
Figure 5 if it were removed from its storage shield. 
4.1.1.3 Shielded Sources 
Water, concrete, earth, and iron or steel all are used for shielding ionizing radiation. All are found in the 
infrastructure of the WTD! Figure 7 shows the fraction of radiation from 60Co that is transmitted through 
a given thickness of water. Of all of the radionuclides in Table 1 (except 226Ra), 60Co emits the most 
penetrating gamma radiation. A source of 60Co under 27” of water has 90% of its radiation absorbed by 
  
23  
the water; another 19” of water will absorb 99% of the radiation; 62” will cut the radiation level by 
99.9%; and 79” of water will absorb 99.99% of the radiation. For 137Cs and 192Ir, the absorbed fractions 
are much greater. 
Figure 7. Transmission through water of 60Co radiation. 
The fractional transmission shown in Figure 7 and Table 6 leads to the conclusion that, if a radioactive 
source is underwater, the farther away a radioactive source is from a detector, the less radiation will reach 
the detector because of absorption, making it very difficult to detect at any significant distance. For 
example, 12’ of water transmits only about 1/100,000,000 of 60Co radiation, so that even a massive source 
separated from a detector by 12’ of water would deliver little radiation to a detector.  
Figure 8 shows that concrete and iron are even more effective as shields than water, a phenomenon that is 
due to their higher density and higher atomic number constituents. It can be seen on the graph that a 10”-
thick concrete wall of a pipe will transmit only about 10% of 60Co gamma radiation, absorbing the other 
90%. It can be seen on the right-hand graph that a 2”-thick iron pipe wall transmits only about 25% of 
60Co gamma radiation, absorbing the other 75%.  
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Table 6. Percent or fraction of 60Co radiation transmitted through various depths of water. 
Water Depth (in.) % Transmitted 
Fraction 
Transmitted 
12.5 50% 1/2 
27 10% 1/10 
45 1% 1/100 
62 0.1% 1/1,000 
79 0.01% 1/10,000 
96 0.001% 1/100,000 
112 0.0001% 1/1,000,000 
128 0.00001% 1/10,000,000 
144 0.000001% 1/100,000,000 
160 0.0000001% 1/1,000,000,000 
176 0.00000001% 1/10,000,000,000 
192 0.000000001% 1/100,000,000,000 
 
  
 
Figure 8. (Left) Transmission of gamma radiation from several radionuclides of interest through 
concrete (147 lb/ft3 = 2.35 g/cm3). (Right) Transmission of gamma radiation from several radionuclides 
of interest through iron (492 lb/ft3 = 7.87 g/cm3). Graphs from (Bureau of Radiological Health 1970). 
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The shielding effect can be looked at in a different way, as reducing dose from radioactive materials 
dissolved in water. Figure 9 shows the percent of dose received from 60Co above various depths in a 
uniform solution. Again, 60Co is used because it is a worst case, meaning that the radiation from 60Co is 
more penetrating than from all other likely sources except 226Ra. The top 7.5” of water delivers fully half 
of the dose, while 90% of the dose comes from the top 22” of water. 
Figure 9. Percent of dose from 60Co dissolved in water above a given depth in the water. 
 
The EPA has published cancer risk coefficients for radioactive contamination (Eckerman et al. 1999). 
These coefficients do not give dose from radioactive contamination in the environment, but rather go 
directly to risk for comparison with chemical carcinogen risk coefficients. 
4.1.1.4 Dilution 
Table 7 shows NRC concentration limits for discharge to sanitary sewers. These numbers are based on 
soluble materials and their relative toxicity.  
 
Table 7. Concentration limits for discharge to sanitary sewage from 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, 
expressed in microcuries per 1,000 L (metric tonne) and per 1,000 gallons. 
Radionuclide Soluble Chemical Form(s) Conc. (µCi/ 1,000 L) 
Conc. 
(µCi/1,000 
gal.) 
60Co All compounds except oxides, hydroxides, halides, 
and nitrates 
3 11.4 
90Sr All soluble compounds including SrTiO3 0.5 1.89 
99Mo  All compounds except oxides, hydroxides, and MoS2 20 75.7 
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131I All compounds 1 3.79 
137Cs All compounds 1 3.79 
192Ir All compounds except halides, nitrates, metallic 
iridium, oxides, and hydroxides 
10 37.9 
226Ra All compounds 0.06 0.23 
Uranium DU, UF6, UO2F2, UO2(NO3)2 0.3 1.14 
Plutonium All compounds except PuO2 0.02 0.076 
241Am All compounds 0.02 0.076 
 
Direct irradiation from water containing these concentrations is utterly trivial, since the concentrations are 
limited by considerations of ingestion, not direct irradiation.  
Because of the countless numbers of pipe shapes and sizes, and volumes of water that occur in the WTD 
system, some simplification must be made. One conceptual means of simplifying is to look at an overall 
worst-case. Because the dose rate to a person cannot exceed the dose rate to the wastewater itself, upper 
limits on dose rates can be calculated for the case when all the radiation energy emitted in the water is 
absorbed in the water (this would occur for an infinite volume or simply large volume). Half this value is 
not a bad approximation for the dose rate in air at the surface of a large, deep pool of uniformly 
contaminated water. As shown in Table 8, adapted from (Eckerman 2004), the radionuclide with the 
highest total energy emitted is 60Co, and it consequently has the most limiting concentration to yield a 
dose rate of 1 rem/h. These values are in the ballpark of 1,000 µCi/gallon or 1 mCi/gallon. The largest 
credible source is 10,000 Ci or 10,000,000 mCi. If this was diluted in 10,000,000 gallons of water, it 
would produce a maximum dose rate of 1 rem per hour with no shielding. If diluted by less water, the 
unshielded dose rates on contact with the water could be higher. If there was less activity, the dose rate 
would be proportionately lower. 
Table 8. Concentrations of selected radionuclides that would deliver 1 rem per hour to an 
infinite volume (an upper limit on dose rate) (Eckerman 2004). 
Nuclide Dose coefficient for immersion in water [rem hr-1  (mCi gal-1)-1 ] 
Dose coefficient at surface of  
water [rem hr-1  (mCi gal-1)-1 ] 
60Co 0.904 0.452 
90Sr + 90Y 0.00386 0.00193 
99Mo 0.0524 0.0262 
131I 0.129 0.0646 
137Cs + 137mBa 0.206 0.103 
192Ir 0.277 0.138 
226Ra 0.00220 0.00110 
235U 0.0503 0.0252 
239Pu 0.0000276 0.0000138 
241Am 0.00542 0.00271 
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At 100 million gallons per day (MGD), 10 million gallons flows past any point in 1/10 day, or 2.4 hours. 
Thus a ball-park estimated exposure to someone in close proximity to such water is 1 rem/hour for 2.4 
hours, or 2.4 rems. That is above the public dose limit, but below the limit for workers, and certainly not a 
dose that would be life-threatening. If the concentration were higher, the transit time would be 
proportionately shorter, so, once the dissolved radioactive material is diluted, doses will be limited. If 
there was shielding, doses would be lower. If the exposed person was at some distance away, doses would 
be lower. 
When radioactivity is reconcentrated in screenings, grit, or biosolids, potential doses are much higher. 
4.1.2 Direct Irradiation: Public 
The various sources are evaluated for who among the public is at risk, and qualitatively what the risk 
might be. These are shown in Table 9. 
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Table 9. Direct Irradiation of the Public. 
Source Who's at Risk? Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Wastewater in pipes on 
the way to the plant 
People near 
manholes 
Pipes are heavily shielded; only "shine" through manholes 
with or without covers would be significant 
Pumping stations People near the station Most pipes and equipment underground or below grade 
Wastewater in the 
treatment plant 
People near the 
plant 
Plant is shielded with earthen barriers; only "skyshine" 
could deliver any dose 
Screenings in plant People near the plant Very low because of distance from public areas 
Screenings in dumpster 
off-site 
People near the 
dumpster Could be very significant to nearby people 
Grit in plant People near the plant Distant from public access 
Grit in dumpster off-site People near the dumpster Could be very significant to nearby people 
Biosolids in digesters People near the plant Distant from public access 
Biosolids in trucks People near the truck Could be very significant to nearby people 
Biosolids applied to 
crops Farmers 
Could be significant during application; less so after 
application 
Crops eaten Consumers Likely to be very dilute 
Resuspended dust from 
biosolids 
Persons 
downwind of 
farm 
Likely to be very dilute 
Treated water 
Scuba divers 
near discharge 
point 
Direct irradiation of the public from water discharged 240' 
below Puget Sound will be effectively zero due to 
shielding and dilution 
Untreated water (WTD 
bypass) 
Scuba divers 
near discharge 
point 
Direct irradiation of the public from water discharged 80' 
below Puget Sound will be very low due to shielding and 
dilution 
4.1.3 Direct Irradiation: WTD Workers 
It is important to remember that all pathways leading to exposure of the public are also potential pathways 
leading to exposure of WTD workers, who are often more likely than members of the public to be near 
WTD facilities and infrastructure (Table 10). This section deals with additional exposure pathways. 
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WTD workers will be closer to wastewater bearing radioactive material than the public, and will spend 
more time at close distances. They will also be in situations where direct irradiation from radioactive 
material in or under wastewater will have less, or even no, shielding. 
Table 10. Direct Irradiation of WTD Workers 
Source Who's at Risk? Qualitative Risk Assessment 
Wastewater in pipes on 
the way to the plant 
Workers in 
pipes 
Direct irradiation potentially of concern. Irradiation times 
from material in sediment or wastewater depends on 
movement and amount of time worker is present. Dose 
depends on distance from radioactive material, and is 
proportional to activity concentration (Ci/gal. in wastewater) 
or activity (Ci in sediment) 
Pumping stations Workers in the station See first entry, above 
Wastewater in the 
treatment plant 
Workers in the 
plant 
See first entry, above. Wastewater becomes more and 
more dilute with time; suspended activity (if any) settles, 
reducing dose rate 
Screenings in plant Workers in the screening area 
Potentially high radiation levels if material is entrained in 
something screenable. Screenings will be radioactive waste 
Screenings in dumpster 
off-site 
Workers near 
screenings 
dumpster 
Potentially high radiation levels if material is entrained in 
something screenable. Screenings will be radioactive waste 
Grit in plant Workers near grit separator 
Potentially the highest radiation levels if material is solid 
pellets (e.g., 60Co) or chunks or small intact source. Grit will 
be radioactive waste 
Grit in dumpster on or 
off-site 
Workers near 
grit dumpster 
Potentially the highest radiation levels if material is solid 
pellets (e.g., 60Co) or chunks or small intact source. Grit will 
be radioactive waste 
Biosolids in digesters Workers near the digesters Shielded by water layer; not expected to be significant 
Biosolids concentrating 
area and truck loading 
area 
Workers in 
loading area 
near the truck; 
drivers 
Could be very significant to nearby workers for materials 
concentrating in biosolids. Biosolids will be radioactive 
waste 
Biosolids transport Drivers Could be significant 
Treated water Workers in the plant 
Some direct irradiation of workers from treated water on its 
way out of plant; significant shielding expected 
Untreated water (WTD 
bypass) 
Workers in the 
plant 
Some direct irradiation of workers untreated water on its 
way out of plant; significant shielding expected 
4.1.4 Direct Irradiation: Microorganisms in Digesters 
Microorganisms in digesters are not expected to receive doses that would be lethal to them. 
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4.1.5 Direct Irradiation: Environmental Concerns 
There are no scenarios in which flora or fauna would receive doses from direct irradiation that would 
threaten a species. There may be localized places where dose rates could be high enough to affect local 
plant or animal communities. 
4.2 Skin Contamination 
Considerations of skin contamination will be limited to members of the public and WTD workers. 
4.2.1 Skin Contamination: Public 
Skin contamination is not expected to be a significant exposure pathway for members of the public 
because a sanitary sewer system keeps wastewater away from the public once it enters the system. 
4.2.2 Skin Contamination: WTD Workers 
Skin contamination could occur for WTD workers if they make dermal contact with wastewater, 
screenings, grit, or biosolids. Since simple sanitation is practiced by WTD workers, the skin 
contamination exposure pathway is not expected to be significant. 
4.3 Ingestion 
Considerations of the ingestion pathway include the public, WTD workers, microorganisms, and the 
environment. 
4.3.1 Ingestion: Public 
Ingestion of radioactive materials from WTD operations by the public can occur via two routes, 
consumption of seafood and anything that feeds on seafood, and consumption of crops grown on soil to 
which has been added contaminated biosolids.  
An undetected radioactive contamination event could lead to the production, delivery, and application to 
farmland of contaminated biosolids. Depending on the crops involved, there may be potential for doses 
somewhat above limits for the public, but this requires detailed modeling beyond the scope of the current 
project. 
4.3.2 Ingestion: WTD Workers 
Waste Treatment Division workers are unlikely to ingest significant amounts of wastewater, so the EPA 
limits described in Table 2 are not relevant for worker protection. 
4.3.3 Ingestion: Microorganisms in Digesters 
Microorganisms in digesters may absorb and even bioconcentrate certain radioactive materials in certain 
chemical forms. These materials are then part of the cell structure, and can produce radiation dose to the 
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microorganisms. Due to diluting and mixing, there are no credible scenarios in which significant harm is 
expected to occur to microorganisms. 
4.3.4 Ingestion: Flora and Fauna in the Environment 
Treated water discharged into Puget Sound will be rapidly diluted, but plants and animals in the vicinity 
will ingest contaminated water and incorporate some of the contamination into their tissues. 
Bioconcentration is known to occur for some radionuclides in some chemical forms. Discharge of 
contaminated water either treated or untreated (due to bypass) could negatively impact the market for 
seafood harvested due to public perception of contamination rather than significant expected doses to the 
public. 
4.4 Inhalation 
Some wastewater may become airborne as mist, carrying dissolved or very fine particulate radioactive 
materials in the mist. Anywhere that one can smell wastewater there is a potential for intakes via 
inhalation. Given the enormous volumes of water generally treated, from hundreds of thousands to 
hundreds of millions of gallons per day, airborne concentrations are likely to be trivial. 
4.4.1 Inhalation: Public 
Inhalation is not expected to be a significant intake route for the public from WTD operations in King 
County. However, wind-borne contamination that becomes resuspended following application of 
biosolids to cropland could be a significant exposure pathway for the public. 
4.4.2 Inhalation: WTD Workers 
Workers may experience inhalation intakes of radionuclides, but it is difficult to imagine a scenario in 
which these would be great. Resuspended contamination in the form of mist is not likely to contain 
enough activity to result in significant intakes. Resuspension from screenings or grit, if dried, may be 
significant. Resuspension of biosolids in the air may occur to a small extent in the truck loading area, and 
could potentially be an intake route. 
4.4.3 Inhalation: Biosolids Applicators and Farmers 
Those applying biosolids to cropland, and farm workers would be expected to experience inhalation 
intakes of radionuclides. Depending on the scenario, this could be a very significant pathway, especially 
for high-radiotoxicity materials like plutonium and 241Am. 
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5.0 Detection 
Detection of radioactive material is beyond the scope of this document. Clearly, placement of sensitive 
gamma radiation detectors with central alarms 
• upstream from the plant 
• at the screenings conveyor 
• at the grit collection point, and  
• at the biosolids collection points 
would be a good plan. Some considerations for detection are given in Table 11. 
Table 11. Direct radiation and aliquot radiation detection considerations 
Radionuclide Direct Detection In Wastewater Detection in Water Sample 
cobalt-60 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
strontium-90 difficult precipitate Sr+2, filter, count filter with Geiger-Muller or liquid scintillation 
molybdenum-99 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
iodine-131 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
cesium-137 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
iridium-192 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
radium-226 sensitive gamma detector sensitive gamma detector 
uranium impossible precipitate U, filter, count filter with liquid scintillation or alpha spectrometry 
americium-241 difficult 
precipitate Am, filter, count filter with Geiger-
Muller, liquid scintillation or alpha 
spectrometry 
plutonium impossible precipitate Pu, filter, count filter with liquid scintillation or alpha spectrometry 
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6.0 Conclusions and Recommendations  
This radiological risk assessment for the King County Wastewater Treatment Division reveals that a 
radiological dispersion event (RDE) that goes initially undetected can have consequences for WTD 
workers and biosolids truckers, the public, farmers, and the environment. Workers can receive radiation 
doses via direct exposure and possibly inhalation. The public can be irradiated by ingestion of seafood 
and crops grown on soil to which contaminated biosolids have been added as well as by inhalation of 
resuspended biosolids dust from treated cropland. Farm workers can be directly irradiated and exposed to 
resuspended biosolids dust. Finally, discharge of treated or untreated wastewater to Puget Sound can 
result in measurable radioactive contamination that could negatively impact the economics of seafood and 
recreation. 
The emergency preparedness and response program should incorporate the lessons and implications of the 
findings given above. Once an RDE is detected, the use of protective measures can greatly reduce doses 
to workers, biosolids truckers, the public, farmers, and the environment. 
It is particularly important that plans be made in advance to segregate, safely store, and dispose of 
radioactive waste that would be generated by deliberately or inadvertently treating contaminated 
wastewater. Such a plan must involve state and federal government agencies. 
A great deal of uncertainty exists on the efficacy of treatment of wastewater for the removal of 
radioactive material, and that even rough estimates of radiological hazards in various parts of the 
wastewater treatment process must be tempered with statements that they are uncertain. Protective actions 
should be based on extensive, ongoing measurements of radiation and radioactive material following an 
incident. 
There are larger issues that should be considered. If an RDE occurs, is it an emergency? If so, what 
radiation protection standards apply? Are WTD workers still considered members of the public, or are 
they emergency first-responders? Will OSHA have emergency worker standards in place? Will the public, 
wastewater workers, and the environment be better off if radioactively contaminated wastewater is 
treated, or will they be better off if the plant is bypassed for some period of time? If bypassing makes 
sense, what criteria are used to trigger bypassing, and when can treatment of wastewater resume? What is 
the duty, if any, of WTD workers to protect the public by treating contaminated wastewater to reduce 
environmental consequences at the price of incurring major costs for management of radioactive waste 
and decontamination of the plant? If an RDE is an act of terrorism by a hostile country or group, does a 
state of war exist? If so, do wartime radiation protection standards apply? Are WTD then soldiers on the 
front lines of the war on terrorism? If so, what actions, radiation protection standards, and cleanup 
activities would be different than in peacetime? 
These questions probably cannot be answered by WTD personnel alone, since they involve the public, 
policy-makers, and lawmakers at the local, state, and federal levels. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has published its National Response Plan (NRP) (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 2004b). There are no specifics in the NRP on the questions 
raised above. The NRP assigns responsibility for wastewater to the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) with support from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD). The DHHS “supplies engineering and environmental health personnel to assist in 
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assessing the status of wastewater and solid-waste facilities.” The EPA “assists in identifying water and 
wastewater needs; supplies sanitary engineers to assess wastewater and solid-waste facilities; provides 
bio-surveillance, warning, and detection capabilities.” The EPA also “assists in investigation and 
intelligence analysis for hazardous materials incidents involving contaminated wastewater or drinking 
water systems.” The DHHS, in coordination with Public Works and Engineering and Oil and Hazardous 
Materials Response as appropriate, may task its components, and request assistance from other 
organizations as appropriate, to assist in assessing potable water, wastewater, solid waste disposal issues, 
and other environmental health issues; conducting field investigations, including collection and laboratory 
analysis of relevant samples; providing water purification and wastewater/solid waste disposal equipment 
and supplies; and providing technical assistance and consultation on potable water and wastewater/solid 
waste disposal issues.” The DoD “Provides available military medical personnel to assist HHS in the 
protection of public health (such as food, water, wastewater, solid waste disposal, vectors, hygiene, and 
other environmental conditions).” 
The DHS has outlined some research areas for wastewater, but only in very general terms (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 2004a). It assigns to EPA the task of “working to produce 
effective and affordable methods, technologies, equipment, and other tools needed to protect drinking 
water and wastewater systems from purposeful attacks. Protection against contamination of 2004 National 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and Development Plan drinking water systems is the highest 
homeland security priority for EPA; physical and cyber security of the Nation's drinking water and  
wastewater systems are also addressed. The products of this R&D are designed for use by drinking water 
and wastewater utility personnel, emergency and follow-up responders, states, EPA regional offices, and 
others involved in protecting human health and the environment.”  
Based on the findings of this report and its companion volumes that address instrumentation and 
emergency response, it is recommended that the King County Wastewater Treatment Division seek 
funding from EPA for developing “effective and affordable methods, technologies, equipment, and other 
tools needed to protect wastewater systems from purposeful attacks.” Research is needed on  
• the transport and fate of radionuclides in wastewater 
• the overall benefits, risks, and costs to public, workers, environment, and wastewater treatment 
authorities so that bypass/treat decisions can be made on a sound basis 
• action levels to bypass and resume treatment of wastewater 
• practical detection and measurement strategies and technologies using off-the-shelf equipment, 
and identifying needs and opportunities for innovation 
• methods of enhancing the removal of radioactive material from wastewater, and sequestration and 
management of the subsequent radioactive waste 
• methods of, and procedures for, decontaminating wastewater treatment plants in the aftermath of 
a radiological dispersion event 
• developing a model radiation protection program to keep doses to wastewater treatment workers 
as low as is reasonably achievable 
  
37  
• determining the special training needs for wastewater workers involved with a radiological 
dispersion event 
• methods of minimizing entry of radioactive materials into combined sanitary and storm sewer 
systems, perhaps by treatment in proximity to the radiological dispersion event. 
Clearly, much work remains to be done. 
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